Comparison of IRA and Hamas by BICOM

View text version View HTML version





Printable version
26/01/2009


BICOM ANALYSIS: THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION AND HAMAS - LESSONS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND

Key Points

Over the last four years, Hamas has participated in national elections and entered into a unity government, but in terms of the calculated use of violence, it has shown no sign of following in the footsteps of the IRA.

Rather than approaching ceasefires as a way to create the basis for longer-term political agreements, Hamas see them as essentially for the purposes of rearming, regrouping militarily and consolidating power.

The political goals of Republicanism contrast starkly with the radical Islamist beliefs which underpin Hamas's stated goal of establishing an Islamic Waqf (trust entity) throughout the whole area of the West Bank, Gaza and Israel.

Moderate Sunni Arab states, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, view the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip as a deeply problematic tool in Iran's arsenal for disrupting regional stability and encroaching Iranian power.

Introduction

In his first week in the Oval Office, President Obama demonstrated his resolve to "hit the ground running" on regional peace-making by appointing Senator George Mitchell to serve as his Middle East special envoy. Mitchell will make his first visit in his new role to Israel and the Palestinian Authority this week. He has experience in the region, having devised the 2001 Mitchell Commission plan in US efforts to stem the violence following the outbreak of the Second Intifada. His appointment naturally draws parallels with the Northern Ireland conflict, as he also chaired talks that culminated in the April 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

Over the years, many respected politicians and commentators have drawn comparisons, recognising that whilst no two conflicts are ever the same, lessons can be learned.[i] The main hope today, especially since Hamas's electoral victory in January 2006, is that where Sinn Féin and the IRA moved away from terrorism for political dialogue with Britain, Hamas could be similarly engaged. This briefing draws upon the Northern Ireland experience to shed light on the most difficult challenges vis-à-vis Hamas which would need to be addressed in order to do so. It also dispels some of the myths about Hamas in current public discourse, either due to wishful thinking, smug imperialist attitudes or plain naivety; in any case, such myths are a dangerous phenomenon. The guiding political questions are first, whether enough of the Hamas leadership are interested in a compromise, and second, whether they are capable of creating an internal consensus. These are critical issues for how the new US administration carves out its role this year.

Commitment to armed struggle

The success of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement perhaps overshadows the chequered history of dialogue which preceded it. Although contact stems back to the 1970s, such as when Northern Ireland Secretary William Whitelaw held secret talks with the provisional IRA in London, a recent Guardian article notes that, "Republicans did not get their seat at the table until they had forsworn violence and agreed to pursue their goals by exclusively peaceful means."[ii]

Similarly, it would seem that not until Hamas leaders internalise the need to renounce violence is it advisable to conceive of them as prospective interlocutors in peace negotiations. As Peter Neumann, a terrorism expert at King's College London, explains, "No one in the IRA ever abandoned the organisation's absolutist ambitions for a united Ireland, but at some point in the late 1980s, the group's leaders realised that their military campaign no longer furthered that aim, and so they began exploring alternatives."[iii]

Over the last four years, Hamas has participated in national elections and entered into a unity government, but in terms of the calculated use of violence, it has shown no sign of following in the footsteps of the IRA. Playing by democratic rules entails more than winning power at the ballot box; Hamas's use of Palestinian ministries to create a new loyal militia - the Executive Force - and turning it on their own people, rather than attempting to build unified Palestinian institutions, is a case in point. Just last Thursday, in a West Bank news conference, senior PA official Yasser Abed Rabbo said that Hamas had "turned its rifles in the direction of Fatah members" after last week's ceasefire with Israel. Militants reportedly shot victims in the kneecaps, the notorious punishment tactic of the IRA in its terror heyday.[iv]

Whereas armed struggle damaged the Republican cause in Northern Ireland, ‘muqawama' (resistance) for Hamas, against Israel, is a defining feature of its authenticity among its supporters in Palestinian society. Last June, Hamas agreed to the six month ‘tahdiyeh' (temporary lull), which it chose not to extend. The idea of a ten year ‘hudna' (truce) has been occasionally mooted by Hamas leaders in the past. Hamas spokesman Ayman Taha has now said the organisation would not agree to more than an 18 month ceasefire.[v] But Hamas leaders are explicit that all these are ‘tactical' manoeuvres. Rather than seeing ceasefires as a way to create a basis for longer-term political agreements, they see them as essentially for the purposes of rearming, regrouping militarily and consolidating power. This is exactly what Hamas did throughout the ceasefire in the second half of 2008, which it used to greatly increase the range of its rockets.[vi] Hamas today remains strategically committed to violent resistance, as Damascus-based political chief Khaled Meshaal explained on 11 January: "We will not accept a permanent truce, because it will take [away] the right of resistance from the Palestinian people."[vii]

Religion and politics

The second dimension of the Northern Ireland conflict, which is instructive in assessing the propensity of Hamas to compromise, concerns the role of religion in respective political visions. Whilst Republicanism is tied to a religious identity - Catholicism - its goals are essentially political - an independent and united Ireland. Moreover, Britain supports the Northern Irish community's will to determine the province's future so long as it is by democratic consent; this is fundamental to the Belfast agreement. A deal was possible because, whilst religion is certainly a factor in Northern Ireland, the IRA never sought to convert Britain into a Catholic country.
This contrasts starkly with the radical Islamist beliefs which underpin Hamas's stated goal of establishing an Islamic Waqf (trust entity) throughout the whole area of the West Bank, Gaza and Israel.[viii] The Hamas Charter is an integrated political-Islamist ideological vision, in which no one - including Arab-Muslim leaders - is entitled to concede any part of this land.[ix] In a recent BBC Today programme interview, former British ambassador to the UN Sir Jeremy Greenstock rejected the idea that Hamas is committed to Israel's destruction, stating that the 1988 Charter was "a rhetorical statement of resistance" which is not part of Hamas's political agenda.[x] It is worth noting that senior Hamas leaders have repeatedly reaffirmed the organisation's full commitment to its founding document, including on 25 January 2006 when Palestinian Legislative Council elections were held.[xi] This sets it at fundamental odds with both Israel and its secular nationalist rivals in the Palestinian Authority. There may be those in the movement who are more open to dialogue than others, but there is little indication that moderate voices are at the forefront of the organisation or sufficient in number to steer its direction. The religious precepts shut out the notion of a permanent political arrangement based on two states which would end Palestinian claims against Israel. They also severely hamper prospects for more progressive thinking to garner momentum within the movement.
The former ambassador also stated that Hamas "is not beholden to Iran," because Hamas is Sunni and Iran is Shia.[xii] Hamas identifies itself as a "wing" of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is indeed a fundamentalist movement from within Sunni Islam. But whilst theologically distinct from the Tehran regime, Hamas is politically aligned with Iran, its key source of military and financial sponsorship, according to British, American, Canadian, Israeli and Palestinian intelligence.[xiii] Hostility to secular Arab nationalism and Western influence are ideological trends common to radical streams within both Sunni and Shia Islam. Moderate Sunni Arab states, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, view the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip as a deeply problematic tool in Iran's arsenal for disrupting regional stability and encroaching Iranian power.

Intra-party friction and constraints

The very different perceptions of Hamas stem from various factors, including its careful use of the international media and well-intentioned peace advocates to promote a peaceful demeanour to the West. The picture is also obscured by the multifaceted nature of the organisation itself. The radical ideology and use of organised terror which characterise Hamas are two significant dimensions of a broad-based political and social movement, which includes the formal political party - headquartered in both Gaza and Damascus - and da'wa, which comprises an extensive social welfare system, charitable services and religious teaching.

In assessing which Palestinian interlocutors to address, the new US administration cannot escape consideration of Hamas's internal dynamics. Here again, the Northern Ireland example is insightful. It took time to build a consensus amidst deep divisions within the Republican movement. As one commentator put it, "[Gerry] Adams and Martin McGuiness resisted any move that would cause a republican split so that when they were finally ready to do a deal, the deal held."[xiv] Rising Catholic prosperity in the province during the 1970s made the IRA's strategy of the ‘long war' far less appealing over time.

This raises questions as to whether anyone in Hamas has the necessary clout to control its rank and file or the internal legitimacy to engage in political dialogue. An inner power struggle continues between Gaza and Damascus, which seems to have been accentuated by the three week conflict with Israel at the turn of the year. Following disagreements about when and under what terms to reach a ceasefire, it was reported that Hamas's armed wing - the Izz a din al-Qassam Brigades - chose to ignore calls by the Damascus leadership to carry out attacks against IDF troops when they were withdrawing from the Strip.[xv] Aware of the gap between prosperity in the West Bank and Gaza widening, local residents are frustrated with Hamas's ‘resistance'. One was quoted as saying, "We do not care how, we want a ceasefire. We want to go back to our homes. Our children need to go back to sleep in their beds."[xvi] It is unclear how far disenchantment with Hamas will develop, but the political constituency to whom the Gaza leadership is actively responsive to - and constrained by - is the local population.

Khaled Meshaal in Damascus, meanwhile, is more concerned with maintaining his broader legitimacy and relevance, hence his calls for the diplomatic isolation of Hamas to end coupled with tough rhetoric: "We need a third ‘Intifada' (uprising) in the West Bank and a revolution in the Arab, Islamic world," he proclaimed during the conflict, "[T]he blood of our women and children and people will increase our cohesion and determination to achieve our aims."[xvii] If a contender for power from within Hamas were to follow Sinn Féin's lead and agree to "democratic and exclusively peaceful means," the Damascus leadership would want to be able to declare the ‘Real Hamas' as the ‘authentic Islamic Resistance Movement'.

Conclusion

When contemplating political negotiations, pragmatists ask whether the other side is amenable to compromise and able to digest all that it would entail internally. The Northern Ireland experience shows that it was not until the Republican movement was ready to declare its war over did the possibility of a historic compromise begin to become realistic.

Hamas's ongoing control of the Gaza Strip continues to present a major obstacle to all key stakeholders in the peace process, including the Palestinian Authority, Israel, Western powers and the moderate Arab states. Its ongoing commitment to violent ‘resistance' as a radical religious and political ideology - and the absence of cohesion in Palestinian politics - deeply exacerbates the challenge they face and ought not to be underestimated. The stakes are even higher when considering the broader picture in which Hamas is politically aligned to Iran, which has regional hegemonic ambitions. As such, the issues of how to face the Hamas challenge in Gaza require ongoing assessment and may benefit from creative ideas by the new US administration. But policymakers will be conscious that engaging Hamas before they are ripe for negotiations could be profoundly counterproductive.

[i] For a guide to the roots of comparative study, see ‘Why Hamas is not Sinn Fein', BICOM Analysis, 24 October 2007.
[ii] Jonathan Freedland, ‘Amid the horror and doom of Gaza, the IRA precedent offers hope', The Guardian, 14 January 2009.
[iii] Peter R. Neumann, ‘Negotiating with Terrorists', Foreign Affairs (86:1), Jan/Feb 2007.
[iv] Griff Witte and Jonathan Finer, ‘Battered Gaza Still In the Grip Of Hamas', Washington Post, 24 January 2009.
[v] Avi Issacharoff, ‘Hamas offers 18-month cease-fire', urges PA to sever talks with Israel', Haaretz, 26 January 2009.
[vi] Avi Issacharoff, Amos Harel and Yuval Azoulay, ‘Meshal: Hamas ready for truce, but only as ‘tactic'', Haaretz, 27 April 2008.
[vii] ‘Meshaal: Resistance is all we have in Gaza', Press TV, 11 January 2009.
[viii] See Article 11 of the Hamas Charter (which can be read online). A full English translation can be read here.
[ix] Further analysis can be read here: The Hamas Charter (1988), Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 21 March 2006.
[x] ‘Hamas diplomacy is ‘hard to see'', BBC Today, 12 January 2009.
[xi] See The Hamas Charter (1988), Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 21 March 2006.
[xii] ‘Hamas diplomacy is ‘hard to see'', BBC Today, 12 January 2009; see also Melanie Philips, ‘Sir Jeremy Greenstock says Hamas is only about ‘resistance', Spectator, 13 January 2009.
[xiii] For further details, see Matthew Levitt (2006), Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Services of Jihad (Yale: London).
[xiv] Jonathan Freedland, ‘Amid the horror and doom of Gaza, the IRA precedent offers hope', The Guardian, 14 January 2009.
[xv] Abraham Rabinovich, ‘Hamas leadership at odds over Gaza truce', The Australian, 13 January 2009; Amos Harel, ‘IDF to conclude withdrawal today', Haaretz, 21 January 2009.
[xvi] Reuters, ‘Enough is enough, say tired Gazans', Gulf News, 17 January 2009.
[xvii] Meshaal: Time has come to talk to Hamas, AFP, 22 January 2009; ‘Meshaal: Resistance is all we have in Gaza', Press TV, 11 January 2009.